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Memorandum 63-52

Subject: Study No. 34(L) - Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article II.
Judicial Notice)

Attached to this memorandum is a tentative recommendation relating to Article II of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Judicial Notice)(2 copies).

We need to approve this recommendation at the November meeting so that we can thereafter send it to the State Bar Committee.

Except as otherwise noted, the tentative recommendation reflects the policy decisions made by the Commission at the October meeting. It is important that you study the comments carefully since they contain material that will assist in determining the meaning of the various rules.

The following matters are noted for Commission attention:

Letter of Transmittal.

We found the New Jersey report very helpful in preparing this recommendation. Portions of a few of the comments are substantially the same as those in the New Jersey Report. Accordingly, we have acknowledged this assistance in the letter of transmittal.

Rule 9.

Subdivision (1)(b). Note that this subdivision embraces more than just "regulations." See the comment to the subdivision for a description of what is included within its scope.

Subdivision (1)(c). Should this paragraph be transferred to subdivision (3)? See comment to this paragraph.

Subdivision (3)(b). This paragraph makes a significant change in existing law, especially insofar as it will permit (or require) judicial notice of ordinances of governmental entities outside of California. The

paragraph omits the words "duly enacted" as unnecessary. The staff recommends approval of the paragraph in the form in which it appears in the tentative recommendation. The substance of the paragraph previously has been approved.

Subdivision (3)(c). Judicial notice has been taken under existing law of official records of state departments and federal agencies. In addition, cases support the taking of judicial notice of records of county planning commissions.

Paragraph (c) does not attempt to spell out the types of records that can be noticed nor the extent to which official action of local governmental subdivisions can be noticed.

Subdivision (3)(d). This subdivision permits judicial notice of court records. Its inclusion as a separate item to be noticed might operate to reduce the scope of subdivision (3)(c). Should paragraph (d) be deleted and the comment to paragraph (c) expanded to make it clear that paragraph (c) includes the material specified in paragraph (d)?

Subdivision (3)(e). Note that judicial notice of "regulations" is required by this paragraph. No qualifying phrase such as "duly published" has been included in the paragraph. No definition of "regulations" is included. See comment to subdivision (1)(b).

Subdivision (3)(g). Many matters judicially noticed under existing law are matters of common knowledge which are not subject to dispute. There is no requirement under existing law that such matters must be determined by reference to "sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." In fact, many of the matters probably are not stated in such sources. At the same time, many of the matters probably could not qualify as matters of "universal knowledge" under subdivision (2) of the revised rule.

There is authority under existing law for judicial notice of facts which are of purely local knowledge. See Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 347 (1919). The following is a statement of the requirements for judicial notice of matters of common knowledge:

(1) The matter must be of common and general knowledge to every person of ordinary intelligence, though it is not necessary that it be of universal knowledge, since scarcely any belief is shared universally by everyone. The knowledge of a majority of mankind, or those familiar with a particular matter in question, is sufficient. But disputable matters do not fall under the head of common knowledge and will not be judicially recognized. (2) The matter must not be doubtful or uncertain, but must be known, established, indisputable, authoritatively settled, and possessed of such notoriety as to justify the assumption of its existence without formal proof. (3) The matter must be known within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. [emphasis supplied.]

This statement is taken from 18 Cal. Jur.2d 439-440.

At the last meeting, the Commission deleted paragraph (c) of subdivision (2) of URE Rule 9. This paragraph would retain our existing law as indicated above. The staff suggests that consideration be given to the following alternatives:

(1) Add "which are matters of common knowledge or" after the word "dispute" in paragraph (g) of the revised rule; or

(2) Add the substance of paragraph (c) of URE Rule 9(2) to Revised Rule 9. The new provision might be phrased as follows:

Specific facts and propositions that are matters of common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and not reasonably subject to dispute.

Subdivision (3)(h). This restates existing law. It is not superseded by the Authentication recommendation. See comment to the paragraph in the tentative recommendation. This paragraph has not been approved in principle by the Commission.

Subdivision (3)(i). This restates existing law. It has not been approved in principle by the Commission. There are cases that rely on this provision of the existing law.

Subdivision (3)(j). The Commission determined to make Rule 9 an exclusive statement of the subjects of which judicial notice may be taken. Hence, it is necessary to indicate that Rule 9 does not prevent judicial notice of matters that may be judicially noticed under other statutes. See the comment to this paragraph. The comment points out that even though some other statute requires judicial notice, judicial notice may nevertheless be discretionary unless the requirements of subdivision (4) of Rule 9 are met.

The following section from the Corporations Code indicates the problem:

§ 6602. Judicial notice of foreign laws and official acts. In any action or proceeding, the court shall take judicial notice without proof in court of the Constitution and statutes applying to foreign corporations, and any interpretation thereof, the seals of State and state officials and notaries public, and of the official acts affecting corporations of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the State or place under the laws of which the corporation purports to be incorporated.

Note that the above section covers some matters (Constitutions and statutes) of which judicial notice must be taken; it includes some matters (some seals) of which notice is discretionary unless the requirements of subdivision (4) are met; and it includes some matters (official acts of legislative, executive, and judicial departments of sister states) of which notice is not permitted under Rule 9.

Subdivision (4)(b). This is taken from a comparable provision in our existing statute relating to judicial notice of the law of foreign countries. That statute contains the word "reasonable." It is suggested that the word "reasonable" be inserted between the words "such" and "notice" in subdivision (4)(b). Even if the word is not inserted, the courts would

probably give the provision this construction. The insertion will make it clear that only reasonable notice is required.

Subdivision (5). The Commission has approved the principle of this subdivision. If this subdivision is included, it becomes important that we make sure that Rule 9 includes all matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See the comment to this subdivision in the tentative recommendation.

Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure lists matters of which courts take judicial notice. It includes the following:

1875. Courts take judicial notice of the following:

1. The true signification of all English words and phrases, and of all legal expressions;
2. Whatever is established by law;

* * *

The "true signification of all English words and phrases" would be included under Rule 9 (3)(g) (verifiable facts). The cases indicate that courts do not take judicial notice of words and phrases unless their meaning is commonly known. People v. Lima, 152 Cal. App.2d 576, 579 (1957); Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Pub. Soc., 99 Cal. 431 (1893); People v. Moore, 211 Cal. App.2d 585, 599-560 (1963). The provisions of Section 1875 for judicial notice of "all legal expressions" and for judicial notice of "whatever is established by law" seem to be included under the provisions of Rule 9 providing for judicial notice of all statutory, constitutional, and decisional law, and regulations, ordinances, and other enactments. No cases have been found based on these phrases, but we have not read all the judicial notice cases.

The judicial notice provisions are not necessary to indicate that matters of law are triable by the court, not by the jury. See C.C.P. Sections 591 and 2102. Foreign country law is an exception, for it was potentially a matter of fact for the jury prior to the 1957 amendment. But our tentative recommendation retains the substance of the 1957 amendment.

Accordingly, the staff believes that our tentative recommendation will cover everything that is now covered by Section 1875.

The tentative recommendation also includes everything that is a matter of judicial notice under other statutes that will be retained. See subdivision (3)(j).

Finally, the tentative recommendation will include those matters that are now judicially noticed as a matter of decisional law if the suggestion is adopted that a new paragraph be added to subdivision (3) to provide for judicial notice of indisputable matters of common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Rule 10.

Subdivision (2)(a). Consideration should be given to revising Rule 10(2)(a) to read:

"(a) Any source of pertinent information, including the advice of persons learned in the subject matter, may be consulted or used, whether or not furnished by a party."

The revision would make clear that paragraph (a) is as broad as paragraph (b) which clearly includes advice of experts.

Subdivision (3). This subdivision was deleted by the Commission at the October meeting. The subdivision was considered unnecessary because it duplicates Rule 9(3) and undesirable because it appears to permit the

judge to use a subjective standard in determining whether to take judicial notice.

This may be a significant change in the URE scheme. Rule 10(3) may be designed to permit a judge to refuse to take judicial notice where he has some doubt--not "sufficient information"--as to the fact. If he does this, should an appellate court be permitted to hold that the trial judge erred because the appellate court determines that he did have "sufficient information" to permit him properly to comply with the request to take judicial notice. It should be noted that the effect of a court's refusal to take judicial notice is to place on the proponent the burden of proving a fact which he has asked the court to accept without proof. Nix v. Hearld, 90 Cal. App.2d 733, 730 (1949). Are we so concerned with requiring notice under subdivision (3) when a request is made that we make the judge determine whether he has "sufficient information" with an appellate court having to determine whether he erred and, if so, whether the error is reversible error. Especially when we are dealing with so-called verifiable facts" or "matter of common knowledge" should the trial judge not have some discretion. Under existing law: "The power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution. It must not be indulged if there is any doubt either as to the fact or as to its being a matter of common knowledge." 18 Cal. Jur.2d 441.

Subdivision (3) of Rule 10 might be restored, and revised to read in substance as follows:

(3) The judge may decline to take judicial notice of a matter under subdivisions (3) and (4) of Rule 9 if he finds in his discretion that the information possessed by or readily available to him, whether or not furnished by the parties:

- (a) Fails to persuade him that the matter falls within Rule 9; or
- (b) Is insufficient to enable him to judicially notice the matter.

The above provision would make a refusal to take judicial notice of a matter specified in subdivision (3) a matter for the exercise of the sound discretion of the judge. The only ground for appeal from a refusal to take judicial notice would be an abuse of discretion.

Rule 11.

Subdivision (2). Should "may and upon request shall" be inserted for "shall" in this subdivision. In effect, this makes the matter of instruction discretionary with the judge unless a request is made. This might avoid unnecessary instructions.

Rule 12.

Subdivision (2). This subdivision is believed to be in accord with the Commission's policy decisions made at the last meeting. It should be carefully considered. The staff recommends approval in the form set out in the tentative recommendation.

Respectfully submitted,

John H. DeMouilly
Executive Secretary

nty.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMMISSION

TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY

Relating to

The Uniform Rules of Evidence

Article II. Judicial Notice

April 1964

California Law Revision Commission
School of Law
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Draft: November 12, 1963

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To His Excellency, Edmund G. Brown
Governor of California
and to the Legislature of California

The California Law Revision Commission was authorized by Resolution Chapter 42 of the Statutes of 1956 to make a study "to determine whether the law of evidence should be revised to conform to the Uniform Rules of Evidence drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by it at its 1953 annual conference."

The Commission herewith submits a preliminary report containing its tentative recommendation concerning Article II (Judicial Notice) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the research study relating thereto prepared by its research consultant, Professor James H. Chadbourn, formerly of the U.C.L.A. Law School, now of the Harvard Law School. Only the tentative recommendation (as distinguished from the research study) expresses the views of the Commission.

This report is one in a series of reports being prepared by the Commission on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, each report covering a different article of the Uniform Rules.

In preparing this report, the Commission considered the views of a Special Committee of the State Bar appointed to study the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence (1963) also was of great assistance to the Commission. Portions of some of the comments in this report are based on similar comments in the report of the New Jersey Committee.

This preliminary report is submitted at this time so that interested persons will have an opportunity to study the tentative recommendation and give the Commission the benefit of their comments and criticisms. These comments and criticisms will be considered by the Commission in formulating its final recommendation. Communications should be addressed to the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

Respectfully submitted,

HERMAN F. SELVIN
Chairman

April 1964

TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CALIFORNIA

LAW REVISION COMMISSION

relating to

THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE

Article II. Judicial Notice

The Uniform Rules of Evidence (hereinafter sometimes designated as "URE") were promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1953.¹ In 1956 the Legislature authorized and directed the Law Revision Commission to make a study to determine whether the Uniform Rules of Evidence should be enacted in this State.²

The tentative recommendation of the Commission on Article II of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is set forth herein. This article, consisting of Rules 9 through 12, relates to judicial notice.

Judicial notice is a judicial shortcut, a doing away with the formal necessity of evidence because there is no real necessity for it. It is used as a substitute for formal proof of matters of law and of facts which everyone knows, or should know, are true. Thus, the process of judicial notice shortens trial time and saves money, for it eliminates unnecessary technicalities of proof, such as the requirement of authentication, expert

1. A pamphlet containing the Uniform Rules of Evidence may be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. The price of the pamphlet is 30 cents. The Law Revision Commission does not have copies of this pamphlet available for distribution.

2. Cal. Stats. 1956, Res. Ch. 42, p. 263.

testimony, best evidence, and the like. In addition, judicial notice promotes rational fact finding; it prevents jurors from erroneously finding as untrue facts which cannot reasonably be disputed.

URE Article II provides a comprehensive scheme for judicial notice. Judicial notice of some matters is mandatory without a request. Other matters may be noticed without a request and must be noticed if requested by a party who gives notice to the adverse parties and furnishes sufficient information to the judge. The Uniform Rules provide parties with a reasonable opportunity to present information to the judge as to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter and as to the tenor of the matter to be noted.

Most of California's existing statutory law in regard to judicial notice is found in Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section lists the matters of which "courts take" judicial notice. But the California courts have not considered the section as limiting the extent of their power to take judicial notice and, although Section 1875 does not so provide, our courts take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge which are certain and indisputable. See People v. Tossetti, 107 Cal. App.7 (1930). As a result, much of the California law on judicial notice can be found only in judicial decisions.

By way of contrast with the URE scheme, the existing California law is unclear and inconsistent. For example, it is not clear which matters must be noticed and which matters may but are not required to be noticed; and an ordinance must be judicially noticed in a criminal case under Penal Code Section 963, but ordinarily the same ordinance may not be judicially noticed in a civil case by a superior or appellate court. Moreover, the existing law does not provide the parties with adequate procedural protections. For example, except as to the law of foreign countries, there does not appear to

be any requirement that the adverse party be notified of a request to take judicial notice. And there is no statutory guarantee that the parties will have a reasonable opportunity to present information to the judge as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and as to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

The Commission tentatively recommends that URE Article II, revised as hereinafter indicated, be enacted as law in California.³ The revised article slightly broadens the list of matters of which judicial notice may be taken under existing law and requires that judicial notice be taken of some matters. This should result in more use of judicial notice with a corresponding reduction in trial time. Any fear of expanded judicial notice should be offset by the procedural protections that will be provided the parties under the revised article.

In the material which follows, the text of each rule proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is set forth and the amendments tentatively recommended by the Commission are shown in ~~strikeout~~ and *italics*. The text of a new rule tentatively recommended by the Commission but not included in the URE is shown in *italics*. Each rule is followed by a comment setting forth the major considerations that influenced the Commission in recommending important substantive changes in the rule or in corresponding California law.

For a detailed analysis of the various rules and the California law relating to judicial notice, see the research study beginning on page 000. This study was prepared by the Commission's research consultant, Professor James H. Chadbourn, formerly of the U.C.L.A. Law School, now of the Harvard Law School.

3. The final recommendation of the Commission will indicate the appropriate code section numbers to be assigned to the rules as revised by the Commission.

RULE 9. FACTS WHICH MUST OR MAY BE JUDICIALLY NOTICED.

(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party [7] of:

(a) The [common-law,-constitutions-and-public-statutes] decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law in force in every state, territory, and jurisdiction of the United States. [7-and]

(b) Any matter required to be noticed under Section 11383 or 11384 of the Government Code or under Section 307 of Title 44 of the United States Code.

(c) Rules of court of this State and of the federal courts.

(2) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party of such specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.

~~[(2)]~~ (3) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party [7] of:

(a) Resolutions and private acts [and-resolutions] of the Congress of the United States and of the legislature of [this] any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. [and-duly-enacted]

(b) Ordinances [-and-duly-published-regulations] of governmental subdivisions or agencies of [this] any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. [and]

(c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States.

(d) Records of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending or of any other court of this State or of any federal court.

(e) Regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of (i) the United States or (ii) any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.

(f) [~~(b)~~] The [~~laws~~] law of foreign countries [,] and governmental subdivisions of foreign countries.

~~[(e)--such-facts-as-are-so-generally-known-or-of-such-common-notoriety within-the-territorial-jurisdiction-of-the-court-that-they-cannot-reasonably be-the-subject-of-dispute,-and-(d)]~~

(g) Specific facts and propositions [~~of-generalized-knowledge~~] not reasonably subject to dispute which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to [~~easily-accessible~~] sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.

(h) The seals of all the courts of this State and of the United States, the seals of office of the principal officers of government in the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States, the seal of every state or sovereign recognized by the executive power of the United States, the seals of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the seals of notaries public.

(i) The official signatures of the principal officers of government in the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States.

(j) Other matters which are authorized or required by other statutes to be judicially noticed.

~~[(3)]~~ (4) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in [~~paragraph-(2)-of-this-rule~~] subdivision (3) if a party request it and:

(a) Furnishes the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply with the request; and

(b) Has given each adverse party such notice through the pleadings or otherwise as will [~~as-the-judge-may-require-to~~] enable [the] such adverse

party to prepare to meet the request.

(5) Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by this rule.

COMMENT

Subdivision (1)

Judicial notice of the matters specified in subdivision (1) is mandatory, whether or not the judge is requested to notice them. The matters specified in this subdivision are all matters that, broadly speaking, can be considered as a part of the "law" applicable to the particular case. The judge can reasonably be expected to discover and apply this law, even if the parties fail to provide him with references to the pertinent cases, statutes, and regulations. Other matters that also may properly be considered as a part of the law applicable to the case (such as the law of foreign countries, certain regulations, and ordinances) are included under subdivision (3), rather than subdivision (1), primarily because of the difficulty of ascertaining such matters.

Although the judge errs if he fails to take judicial notice of the matters specified in subdivision (1), such error is not necessarily reversible error. Depending upon the circumstances, the appellate court may or may not invoke and apply the doctrine that the error which the appellant has "invited" is not reversible error, or the appellate court may apply the doctrine that points not urged in the trial court may not be advanced on appeal. These and similar principles are not abrogated by subdivision (1).

Listed below are the matters that are included under subdivision (1).

California and Federal Law. The decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of California and of the United States must be judicially noticed under subdivision (1)(a). This requirement states existing law as found in subdivision (3) of Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Law of Sister States. The decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law in force in sister states must be judicially noticed under subdivision (1)(a). Courts now take judicial notice of the law of sister states under subdivision (3) of Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the revised rule requires notice of relevant decisions of all sister-state courts, whereas Section 1875 seems to preclude notice of interpretation of sister-state law by intermediate-appellate and trial sister-state courts. The existing law is not clear as to whether a request for judicial notice of sister-state law is required and whether judicial notice is mandatory. On necessity for request for judicial notice see 24 Calif. L. Rev. 311, 316 (1936). On whether judicial notice is mandatory see In re Bartages, 44 Cal.2d 241 (1955) and opinion of Supreme Court in denying a hearing in Estate of Moore, 7 Cal. App.2d 722, 726 (1935).

Law of Territories and Jurisdictions of the United States. The decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law in force in the territories and jurisdictions of the United States must be judicially noticed under subdivision (1)(a). It is not clear under existing California law whether this law is treated as sister-state law or foreign law. See Witkin, California Evidence 60 (1958).

Regulations of California and Federal Agencies. Judicial notice must be taken under subdivision (1)(b) of the rules, regulations, orders, and standards of general application adopted by California state agencies and

filed with the Secretary of State or printed in the California Administrative Code or the California Administrative Register. This is existing California law as found in Government Code Sections 11383 and 11384.

Judicial notice also must be taken under subdivision (1)(b) of the contents of the Federal Register. This will require California courts to judicially notice documents published in the Federal Register (such as (1) presidential proclamations and executive orders having general applicability and legal effect and (2) orders, regulations, rules, certificates, codes of fair competition, licenses, notices, and similar instruments, having general applicability and legal effect issued, prescribed or promulgated by federal agencies). There is no clear holding that this is existing California law. Although 44 U.S.C. Section 307 provides that the "contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed," it is not clear that this requires notice by state courts. But see Broadway Fed. Etc. Loan Assoc. v. Howard, 133 Cal. App.2d 382, 386, 285 P.2d 61(1955) (referring to federal statute). See also Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1141 (1946)(doubt expressed that notice is required); Knowlton, Judicial Notice, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 501, 504 (1956)("it would seem that this provision is binding upon the state courts"). Livermore v. Beal, 18 Cal. App.2d 535, 542-543 (1937) suggests that California courts are required to judicially notice pertinent federal official action, and California courts have judicially noticed the contents of various proclamations, orders and regulations of federal agencies. E.g., Pacific Solvents Co. v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App.2d 953 (1948)(orders); People v. Mason, 72 Cal. App.2d 699, 706-707 (1946)(presidential and executive proclamations); Downer v. Grizzly Livestock & Land Co., 6 Cal. App.2d 39 (1935)(regulation). The revised rule will make the California law clear.

Rules of Court. Judicial notice of the rules of the courts of this State and of the federal courts is required under subdivision (1)(c). This may change existing California law, for a number of older cases indicate that our appellate courts do not take judicial notice of the rules of the lower courts. E.g., Warden v. Mendocino County, 32 Cal. 655 (1867); Cutter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178 (1874); Gannon v. Earley & Thompson, 97 Cal. App. 452 (1929). However, these cases are inconsistent with the modern philosophy of judicial notice as indicated by the holding in Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 496-497 (1961)(stating that judicial notice would be taken of records and proceedings of courts of this State and federal courts and overruling cases to the contrary). Moreover, rules of court of California and federal courts are, or should be, familiar to the court or easily discoverable from materials readily available to the court. Since the same cannot be said of the rules of court of sister states and other jurisdictions, there is no provision in the revised rules requiring or permitting judicial notice of them.

Subdivision (2)

Subdivision (2) requires judicial notice without a request of indisputable facts and propositions universally known. "Universally known" does not mean that every man on the street has knowledge of such facts. A fact known among persons of reasonable and average intelligence and knowledge will satisfy the "universally known" requirement. Cf. People v. Tossetti, 107 Cal. App. 7, 12 (1930).

Subdivision (2) should be contrasted with paragraph (g) of subdivision (3) which provides for judicial notice of specific facts and propositions which are indisputable and are capable of immediate and accurate determination

by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. Paragraph (g) permits notice of facts and propositions, that are indisputable but are not "universally" known.

Judicial notice does not apply to facts merely because they are known to the judge to be indisputable. They must fulfill the requirements of subdivision (2) or subdivision (3)(g). If a judge happens to know a fact that is not widely enough known to be subject to judicial notice under Rule 9, he may not "notice" it.

It is clear under existing law that the judge may notice the matters specified in subdivision (2); it is doubtful, however, that he must notice them. See Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 347 (1919)(dictum). Since subdivision (2) covers universally known facts, the parties ordinarily will expect the judge to take judicial notice of them; the judge should not be permitted to ignore such facts merely because the parties fail to make a formal request for judicial notice.

Subdivision (3)

Subdivision (3) includes both matters of law and fact. The judge may take judicial notice of these matters, even when not requested to do so; and the judge is required to notice them if a party requests it and satisfies the requirements of subdivision (4).

The matters of law included under subdivision (3) are ones which may neither be known to the judge nor easily discoverable by him because the sources of information are not readily available. However, if a party requests it and furnishes the judge with "sufficient information" for him to take judicial notice, the judge must do so if proper notice has been given to the adverse parties. Thus, judicial notice of these matters of law is mandatory only if counsel has adequately accepted his responsibility for informing the judge. If the judge is adequately informed as to the law applicable to the case, there is no reason why the simplified process of judicial notice should not be applied to all of it, including such law as ordinances and the law of foreign countries.

Although subdivision (3) extends judicial notice to some matters of law of which courts do not take judicial notice under existing law, the wider scope of judicial notice is balanced by the assurance that the matter need not be judicially noticed unless adequate information to support its truth is furnished to the judge and to other parties. In addition, the parties are entitled under Rule 10 to a reasonable opportunity to present information to the judge relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

Listed below are the matters that are included under subdivision (3).

Resolutions and Private Acts. Subdivision (3)(a) provides for judicial notice of the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United States and of the legislature of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.

The California law on this matter is unclear. Our courts would take notice of private statutes of this State and the United States under subdivision (3) of Section 1875 and probably would take judicial notice of resolutions of this State and the United States under the same subdivision. It is not clear whether such notice is compulsory. It may be that notice of a private act pleaded in a criminal action pursuant to Penal Code Section 963 is mandatory, whereas notice of the same private act pleaded in a civil action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 459 is discretionary.

Although no cases have been found, California courts probably would not take judicial notice of a resolution or private act of a sister state or territory or jurisdiction of the United States. Although Section 1875 is not the exclusive list of the matters that will be judicially noticed, the courts would not take judicial notice of a private statute prior to the enactment of Section 1875. Ellis v. Eastman, 32 Cal. 447 (1867).

Ordinances. Subdivision (3)(b) provides for judicial notice of the ordinances of governmental subdivisions or agencies of any state, territory or jurisdiction of the United States.

This subdivision would change existing California law. Under existing law, municipal courts may take judicial notice of ordinances in force within their jurisdiction. People v. Crittenden, 93 Cal. App.2d Supp. 871, 877 (1949); People v. Cowles, 142 Cal. App.2d Supp. 865 (1956).

And an ordinance pleaded in a criminal action pursuant to Penal Code Section 963 must be judicially noticed. On the other hand, neither the superior court nor a district court of appeal will take judicial notice of municipal or county ordinances. Los Angeles County v. Bartlett, 203 Cal. App.2d 523 (1962); Thompson v. Guyer-Hays, 207 Cal. App.2d 366 (1962); Becerra v. Hochberg, 193 Cal. App.2d 431 (1961). It seems safe to assume that ordinances of sister states and of territories and jurisdictions of the United States would not be judicially noticed under existing law.

Official Acts of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments.

Paragraph (c) of subdivision (3) provides for judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States. This paragraph is not found in the URE, but it states existing law as found in subdivision (3) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875. Under this provision, our courts have taken judicial notice of a wide variety of administrative and executive acts, such as proceedings and reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and records of the State Board of Education and a county planning commission. See Witkin, California Evidence § 49 (1958) and supplement thereto.

This paragraph overlaps to some extent with the matters specified in subdivision (1) of the revised rule. In case of such an overlap, notice will be mandatory under subdivision (1).

Court Records. Paragraph (d) of subdivision (3) provides for judicial notice of the records of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending or of any other court of this State or of any federal court. This paragraph is not found in the URE, but it states existing law. Flores v.

Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492 (1961). Paragraph (d) may be unnecessary since these court records would be included in paragraph (c), but paragraph (d) has been included because there has been some uncertainty in existing law. See the Flores case, supra.

Regulations. Paragraph (e) provides for judicial notice of regulations of governmental subdivisions and agencies of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. Notice of certain regulations of California and federal agencies is mandatory under subdivision (1)(b). Paragraph (e) provides for notice of California and federal regulations that are not included under subdivision (1)(b) and for notice of regulations of other states and of territories and jurisdictions of the United States.

Both California and federal regulations have been judicially noticed under subdivision (3) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875. 18 Cal. Jur.2d 447-448. Although no cases have been found, it is unlikely that regulations of other states or of territories or jurisdictions of the United States would be judicially noticed under existing law.

Law of Foreign Countries. Paragraph (f) of subdivision (3) provides for judicial notice of the law of foreign countries and governmental subdivisions of foreign countries. Paragraph (f) should be read in connection with Rule 10.5 and paragraph (b) of subdivision (2) of Rule 10. These provisions retain the substance of our existing law which was enacted in 1957 upon recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. See 3 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, Recommendation and Study at I-1 (1957).

Paragraph (f) refers to "the law" of foreign countries and governmental subdivisions of foreign countries. This makes all law, in whatever form,

subject to judicial notice. Since the law of a foreign country may take a number of unanticipated forms, it is best not to limit this paragraph by a definition of "law."

Verifiable Facts. Paragraph (g) of subdivision (3) provides for judicial notice of indisputable facts immediately ascertainable by reference to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. Sources of "reasonably indisputable accuracy" includes not only treatises, encyclopedias, almanacs, and the like, but also persons learned in the subject matter. This would not mean that reference works would be received in evidence or sent to the jury room. Their use would be limited to consultation by the judge and the parties for the purposes of determining whether or not to take judicial notice and to determine the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

This paragraph includes, for example, facts which are accepted as established by experts and specialists in the natural, physical and social sciences if those facts are of such wide acceptance that to submit them to the jury would be to risk irrational findings. The paragraph includes such matters listed in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875 as the "geographical divisions and political history of the world" and "the true significance of all English words and phrases." To the extent that paragraph (g) overlaps with subdivision (2), notice is, of course, mandatory under subdivision (2).

The matters covered by paragraph (g) are included in subdivision (3)--rather than subdivision (2)--because it seems reasonable to put the burden on the parties to bring adequate information before the judge if judicial notice is to be mandatory. See subdivision (4) and comment relating thereto.

Under existing California law, the courts take judicial notice of the matters that are included under paragraph (g), either pursuant to Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure or because such matters are matters of common knowledge and are certain and indisputable. Witkin, California Evidence 65-68 (1958). Notice of these matters is probably not compulsory under existing law.

Seals. Paragraph (h) of subdivision (3) states the portions of subdivisions (5), (6), (7) and (8) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875 relating to seals. Judicial notice of seals is less significant under the Uniform Rules as revised by the Commission than it is under existing law since a seal ordinarily is not required to authenticate a writing. See Tentative Recommendation relating to Authentication and Content of Writings. Nonetheless, the provisions of Section 1875 relating to seals are retained since the use of a certified copy is one method of authenticating a writing under the tentative recommendation relating to authentication. See People v. Hollander, 163 Cal. App.2d 379, 329 P.2d 740 (1958) (prosecution for issuing fictitious checks: protests authenticated by signature and seal of Arizona notary; judicial notice taken of notarial seal).

Official Signatures. Paragraph (i) of subdivision (3) states the portion of subdivision (6) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875 relating to official signatures.

Matters Authorized or Required to be Noticed by Other Statutes. A number of California statutes authorize or require particular matters to be judicially noticed. E.g., Government Code Section 18576 (rules of the State Personnel Board); Penal Code Section 963 (certain ordinances and private statutes); Corporations Code Section 6602 (law and other matters

relating to foreign corporations); Public Utilities Code Section 306 (seal of Public Utilities Commission).

Paragraph (j) of subdivision (3) makes clear how these other statutes fit into the scheme of the article on judicial notice: To the extent that matters specified in these other statutes are required to be judicially noticed under subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 9, judicial notice is mandatory without a request. To the extent that such matters are not required to be judicially noticed under subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 9, judicial notice will be optional with the judge unless the requirements of subdivision (4) of Rule 9 are met, even though the particular statute appears to make judicial notice mandatory without a request. Thus, the procedural protections provided by Rules 10 through 12 will apply to the extent that the other statutes cover matters not specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 9.

Subdivision (4)

This subdivision provides that the matters specified in subdivision (3) must be judicially noticed by the judge if a party (a) requests it, (b) provides the judge with sufficient information, and (c) gives the adverse parties such notice as is specified in the subdivision.

The substance of the URE notice requirement has been retained, but it has been rephrased so that the judge is not required to make an initial determination as to the time and form of notice in each case. Under the revised rule, the person requesting judicial notice must give each adverse party such notice through the pleadings or otherwise as will enable him to prepare to meet the request. In cases where the notice given does not satisfy this requirement, the judge may decline to take judicial notice. A similar notice to the adverse parties is required under subdivision (4) of Section 1875 when a request for judicial notice of the law of foreign countries is made. Subdivision (4) of Rule 9 broadens this existing requirement to cover all matters specified in subdivision (3) of Rule 9.

The notice requirement is an important one, since under Rule 11 judicial notice is binding on the jury. Accordingly, in cases where a question arises as to whether judicial notice should be taken or as to the tenor of the matter to be noted, the adverse parties should be given ample notice and opportunity to oppose the taking of judicial notice or to present information relevant to the tenor of the matter to be noted.

On the other hand, since subdivision (3) relates to a wide variety of facts and law, the notice requirement should be administered with flexibility in order to insure that the policy behind the judicial notice rules is properly implemented. In many cases it will be reasonable to expect

notice to be given at or before the time of the pretrial conference. In other cases, certain facts or law of which the judge should take judicial notice may come up at trial. Subdivision (3) merely requires reasonable notice, and the reasonableness of the notice given will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. Moreover, subdivision (3) provides that notice may be taken of all facts and law included therein without request by a party. Thus, the judge is authorized to take judicial notice even if notice has not been given to the adverse parties. He should not refuse to take judicial notice by virtue of a strict interpretation of the notice requirement which is intended as a safeguard and not as a rigid bar.

What will be "sufficient information" to enable a judge "properly to comply with" a request to judicially notice a matter specified in subdivision (3) will depend on each case. Rule 10(2) provides that the judge may consult and use any source of pertinent information and is not bound by the exclusionary rules of evidence, but subdivisions (3) and (4) of Rule 9 do not define what is "sufficient information." That will vary from case to case. While parties will understandably use the best evidence they can afford under the circumstances, mechanical requirements, ill-suited to the individual case, should be avoided. In particularly complicated cases, the judge might justifiably feel that expert testimony is needed to clarify especially difficult problems. In any event, he may consult experts and other sources not presented to him by the parties.

Subdivision (5)

This subdivision makes clear that judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by statute. By way of contrast,

the principal judicial notice provision found in existing law--Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875--does not limit judicial notice to matters listed in that section; and judicial notice has been taken of various matters not so listed, the principal non-statutory matters subject to judicial notice being matters of common knowledge which are certain and indisputable. Since Rule 9 specifies all matters which should be judicially noted, subdivision (5) provides a desirable certainty not found in existing California law.

Subdivision (5) should not be thought to prevent courts from considering whatever materials are appropriate in construing statutes, determining constitutional issues, and formulating rules of law. That a court may take note of legislative history, discussions by learned writers in treatises and law reviews, and similar materials is inherent in the requirement that it take notice of the law, for in many cases the meaning and validity of statutes, the precise nature of a common law rule, or the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision can be determined only with the help of such extrinsic aids. Cf. People v. Sterling Refining Co., 86 Cal. App. 558, 564 (1927)(statutory authority to notice "public and private acts" of legislature held to authorize examination of legislative history of certain acts). Rule 9 will neither broaden nor limit the extent to which a court may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the rules of law it is required to note.

C
RULE 10. DETERMINATION AS TO PROPRIETY OF TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE AND TENOR OF MATTER NOTICED

(1) Before determining whether to take judicial notice of any matter specified in subdivision (3) of Rule 9, the judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice of [a] the matter [e]; and, before determining the tenor of any matter specified in subdivision (3) of Rule 9, the judge shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

(2) In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or the tenor thereof [7] :

(a) [~~the judge may consult and use~~] Any source of pertinent information may be consulted or used, whether or not furnished by a party [7; and]

C
(b) In cases falling within paragraph (f) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9, if the judge resorts to the advice of persons learned in the subject matter, such advice, if not received in open court, shall be in writing and made a part of the record in the action or proceeding.

[~~(b)~~] (c) No exclusionary rule except a valid claim of privilege shall apply.

[~~(3)~~--If the information possessed by or readily available to the judge, whether or not furnished by the parties, fails to convince him that a matter falls clearly within Rule 9, or if it is insufficient to enable him to notice the matter judicially, he shall decline to take judicial notice thereof.]

C
[~~(4)~~--In any event the determination either by judicial notice, or from evidence of the applicability and the tenor of any matter of common law, constitutional law, or of any statute, private act, resolution, ordinance or regulation falling within Rule 9, shall be a matter for the judge and not for the jury.]

COMMENT

Subdivision (1). This subdivision guarantees the parties a reasonable opportunity to present information to the judge as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and as to the tenor of the matter to be noticed. The URE provision has been revised to limit its application to matters specified in subdivision (3) of Revised Rule 9.

What constitutes a "reasonable opportunity to present information" will depend on the importance of the matter to the case and the complexity of the matter. For example, in a case where there is no dispute as to the existence and validity of a city ordinance, no formal hearing would be necessary to determine the propriety of taking judicial notice of the ordinance and of its tenor. But where there is a complex question as to the tenor of the law of a foreign country applicable to the case, the granting of a hearing under subdivision (1) would be mandatory. The New York courts have so construed their judicial notice statute, saying that an opportunity for a litigant to know what the deciding tribunal is considering and to be heard with respect to it is guaranteed by due process of law. Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 182 Misc. 336, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).

Subdivision (2). Since one of the purposes of judicial notice is to simplify the process of proof-making, the judge should be given considerable latitude in deciding what sources are trustworthy. This subdivision permits the judge to use any source of pertinent information, including the advice of persons learned in the subject matter. As revised, it probably

restates existing law as found in Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Research Study, pp. 24-26.

If the judge resorts to the advice of experts to assist him in determining the law of a foreign country, subdivision (2) requires that such advice, if not received in open court, be in writing and made a part of the record. This requirement is based on a similar requirement found in Section 1875. Because foreign law may be based on concepts alien to our judicial system, the extra-judicial advice used by the judge in taking judicial notice of foreign law should be made a matter of record so that it will be available for examination by the parties and by the reviewing court on appeal.

Subdivision (3). This subdivision has been deleted. To the extent it merely repeats the principle of sufficiency set forth in Revised Rule 9(4), subdivision (3) is unnecessary duplication. To the extent that it makes Rule 9 an exclusive list of matters that may be judicially noticed, it is unnecessary since that principle has been more clearly stated in subdivision (5) of Revised Rule 9.

Subdivision (4). This subdivision has been deleted as superfluous. The principle is well established that matters of law are for the judge, not for the jury; and under Rule 11 any matter judicially noticed which would otherwise have been for determination by the jury must be accepted as a fact by the jury.

RULE 10.5. PROCEDURE WHEN JUDGE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT FOREIGN LAW IS.

If the judge is unable to determine what the law of a foreign country or a governmental subdivision of a foreign country is, he may, as the ends of justice require, either (a) apply the law of this State if he can do so consistently with the Constitution of this State and of the United States or (b) dismiss the action or proceeding without prejudice.

COMMENT

This rule restates existing California law as found in the last sentence of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875. The rule continues in effect statutory language enacted in 1957 upon recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. See 3 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, Recommendation at I-6 (1957).

RULE 11. [~~Instructing-the-Trier-of-Fact-as-to-Matter-Judicially-Noticed.~~]

NOTING FOR RECORD MATTER JUDICIALLY NOTICED; INSTRUCTING JURY.

(1) If a matter judicially noticed is other than [~~the-common-law-or-constitution-or-public-statutes-of-this-state~~] one specified in subdivision (1) of Rule 9, the judge shall at the earliest practicable time indicate for the record the matter which is judicially noticed and the tenor thereof.

(2) If [~~the~~] a matter judicially noticed is one which would otherwise have been for determination by [~~a-trier-of-fact-other-than-the-judge,-he~~] the jury, the judge shall instruct the [~~trier-of-the-fact~~] jury to accept as a fact the matter so noticed.

COMMENT

Subdivision (1). This subdivision requires that the judge at the earliest practicable time indicate for the record a matter which is judicially noted. However, matters of law judicially noticed under subdivision (1) of Rule 9 are not included within this requirement. The requirement is imposed in order to provide the parties with an adequate opportunity to try their case in view of the fact noticed. In addition, needless dispute sometimes results from the failure of the judge to put in the record matters which he has judicially noticed. No comparable requirement is found in existing California law.

Subdivision (2). This subdivision makes matters judicially noticed binding on the jury. It makes clear that there is no right to introduce evidence disputing the fact as noticed by the judge. The subdivision is limited to instruction on a matter that would otherwise have been for determination by the jury; instruction

C of juries on matters of law is not a matter of evidence and is covered by the general provisions of law governing instruction of juries. Subdivision (2) states existing law as found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 2102. See People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 624-625 (1896).

RULE 12. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO TRIAL.

(1) The failure or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a matter, or to instruct the ~~[trier-of-fact]~~ jury with respect to the matter, ~~[shall]~~ does not preclude the judge from taking judicial notice of the matter in subsequent proceedings in the action.

~~[(2)--The-rulings-of-the-judge-under-Rules-9,-10-and-11-are-subject to-review.]~~

~~[(3)--The-reviewing-court-in-its-discretion-may-take-judicial-notice of-any-matter-specified-in-Rule-9-whether-or-not-judicially-noticed-by-the judge.]~~

(2) Whether or not judicially noticed by the judge, the reviewing court shall judicially notice, in the manner provided by subdivision (2) of Rule 10, any matter specified in Rule 9 when the judge was obliged to notice it. The reviewing court shall judicially notice any matter properly judicially noticed by the judge. In other cases, the reviewing court may notice matters specified in Rule 9 in its discretion and has the same powers as the judge under Rule 10.5.

~~[(4)]~~ (3) Before taking judicial notice under this rule of a matter specified in subdivision (3) of Rule 9, the [A] judge or [a] reviewing court taking judicial notice [under-Paragraph-(1)-or-(3)-of-this-rule] of a matter not theretofore so noticed in the action or proceeding shall afford the parties reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter to be noticed.

COMMENT

Rule 12 sets forth a separate set of rules for the taking of judicial notice in proceedings subsequent to trial and in appellate proceedings.

Subdivision (1). This subdivision provides that the failure or even the refusal of a judge to take judicial notice of a matter at the trial does not bar the trial judge, or another trial judge, from taking judicial notice of that matter in a subsequent proceeding, such as a motion for a new trial or the like. Although no California cases have been found, it seems safe to assume that the trial judge has the power to take judicial notice of a matter in subsequent proceedings, since the appellate court can properly take judicial notice of any matter of which the trial court could properly take judicial notice. See People v. Tossetti, 107 Cal. App. 7, 12 (1930).

Subdivision (2). Subdivision (2) of the revised rule requires that a reviewing court take judicial notice of any matter which the trial judge was obliged to notice. This means that the matters specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 9 must be judicially noticed by the reviewing court even though the trial court did not take judicial notice of such matters. The matters specified in subdivision (3) of Rule 9 must also be judicially noted by the reviewing court if an appropriate request was made at the trial level. See Rule 9(4).

Having taken judicial notice of such a matter, the reviewing court may or may not apply it in the particular case on appeal.

C The effect to be given to matters judicially noticed on appeal, where the question has not been raised below, depends on factors that are not evidentiary in character and are not mentioned in these rules. For example, the appellate court is required to notice the matters of law mentioned in Rule 9(1); but it may apply the doctrine that an error which the appellant has "invited" is not reversible error, or the doctrine that points not urged in the trial court may not be advanced on appeal, and refuse to apply the law to the pending case. But these principles do not mean that the appellate court does not take judicial notice of the applicable law; they merely mean that for reasons of policy governing appellate review, the appellate court may refuse to apply the law to the case before it.

C Subdivision (3). Subdivision (3) of the revised rule provides the parties with the same procedural protection when judicial notice is taken in proceedings subsequent to trial as is provided by subdivision (1) of Revised Rule 10.

Deleted Provisions of URE Rule. Subdivision (2) of the URE rule has been deleted as unnecessary. The principle of this subdivision is well established by existing case law. See extensive annotations to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1875 in West's Anno. Calif. Codes and Deering's Anno. Calif. Codes. No comparable provision is included in existing law or in other URE rules.

C Subdivision (3) of the URE rules also has been deleted. This subdivision is superseded by subdivision (2) of the revised rule.

AMENDMENTS AND REPEALS OF EXISTING
STATUTES

Set forth below is a list of existing statutes relating to judicial notice that should be revised or repealed in light of the Commission's tentative recommendation concerning Article II (Judicial Notice) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The reason for the suggested revision or repeal is given after each section. References in such reasons to the Uniform Rules of Evidence are to the Uniform Rules as revised by the Commission.

Code of Civil Procedure

Section 1875 provides:

1875. JUDICIAL NOTICE. Courts take judicial notice of the following:

1. The true signification of all English words and phrases; and of all legal expressions;
2. Whatever is established by law;
3. Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of this State and of the United States, and the laws of the several states of the United States and the interpretation thereof by the highest courts of appellate jurisdiction of such states;
4. The law and statutes of foreign countries and of political subdivisions of foreign countries; provided, however, that to enable a party to ask that judicial notice thereof be taken, reasonable notice shall be given to the other parties to the action in the pleadings or otherwise;
5. The seals of all the courts of this State and of the United States;
6. The accession to office and the official signatures and seals of office of the principal officers of government in the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States;
7. The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every state or sovereign recognized by the executive power of the United States;
8. The seals of courts of admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction, and of notaries public;

9. The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions and political history of the world.

In all these cases the court may resort to its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference. In cases arising under subdivision 4 of this section, the court may also resort to the advice of persons learned in the subject matter, which advice, if not received in open court, shall be in writing and made a part of the record in the action or proceeding.

If a court is unable to determine what the law of a foreign country or a political subdivision of a foreign country is, the court may, as the ends of justice require, either apply the law of this State if it can do so consistently with the Constitutions of this State and of the United States or dismiss the action without prejudice.

This section should be repealed. Each portion of this section is superseded by the portion of the URE indicated below.

<u>Section 1875</u>	<u>URE</u>
Portion of subdivision (1) relating to "true signification of all English words and phrases"	Superseded by paragraph (g) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Portion of subdivision (1) relating to "legal expressions" and all of subdivision (2)	Superseded by subdivision (1) of Rule 9 and paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Subdivision (3)	Superseded by subdivision (1) and subdivision (3) (a), (c), and (d) of Rule 9
Subdivision (4)	Superseded by subdivision (3) (f) and subdivision (4) of Rule 9
Subdivision (5)	Superseded by subdivision (3) (h) of Rule 9

Subdivision (6)	Superseded by paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Subdivision (7)	Superseded by paragraphs (g) and (h) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Subdivision (8)	Superseded by paragraph (h) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Subdivision (9)	Superseded by subdivision (2) and paragraph (g) of subdivision (3) of Rule 9
Penultimate paragraph	Superseded by subdivision (2) of Rule 10
Last paragraph	Superseded by Rule 10.5

Section 2102 should be revised to read:

2102. QUESTIONS OF LAW ADDRESSED TO THE COURT
 All questions of law, including the admissibility of testimony, the facts preliminary to such admission, and the construction of statutes and other writings, and other rules of evidence, are to be decided by the court, and all discussions of law addressed to it. [~~Whenever the knowledge of the court is, by this code, made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it.~~]

The deleted portion of Section 2102 is superseded by subdivision (2) of Rule 11.